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M ost o f the perm utations resulting from these four disputes are untenable because of either internal or contextual inconsistency, and have not been advocated,1 while others duplicate one another in different form s, so that ultim ately there seem only three basic interpretations, each with several variations resulting from various attem p ts to defend them . One of these interpretations is the traditional one, dating back at least to O lym piodorus,2 which can be stated, in term s of the above alternatives, as follows:
It will surprise you (but is true) to hear th at this alone is absolute, namely th at it is always better to be dead than to live; and it is surprising (but true) th at people cannot confer this benefit upon themselves.
A second, com paratively recent interpretation m ay be stated as :
1. An exception is the interpretation of R. D. Archer-Hind (The Phaedo o f Plato, London : MacMillan, 1883, p. 56), which sees Socrates as here sanctioning suicide. But this is hardly possible in context, since the passage is Socrates' explanation of why suicide is not permissible, and Archer-H ind's interpretation has not been defended by others. 
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It would be surprising if (i.e. is false that) this alone were absolute, namely that it is never better to be dead than to liv e ; and it is surprising (but true) th at those for whom death is better m ay not confer this benefit upon themselves.
The traditional interpretation thus says th at it is true that death is always better, while the m odern says it is false that death is never better, the dispute being whether death is universally good or only occasionally so.
The third general in terpretation involves taking " this" , in line 1, to refer to suicide or the im propriety of suicide, giving the passage the following sen se:
It will surprise you (but is true) to hear th at this alone is absolute, nam ely that suicide is not rig h t; and it is surprising (but true) that even those for whom it is better to be dead cannot benefit themselves.
This interpretation, though neither as venerable as the first nor defended in recent literature, was evidently popular in the last century, as Burnet refers to it as " the interpretation of m ost recent editors" (62A2). He rejects it, however, on the ground that " no one has suggested th at the lawlessness of suicide is the only rule which is absolute, and the suggestion would be absurd." A lthough he does not explain the nature o f this absurdity, one can at least say that nothing in Plato would support the claim th at suicide is absolutely im m oral while m urder in general is not. M oreover P lato 's ethical position certainly gives the impression th at crim es against others are worse than those against oneself. W hether or not because of B urnet's observation that it attributes to P lato an " ab surdity" , this interpretation does not seem to have been advocated in the subsequent literature, and does not seem cogent to me.
W hichever of the rem aining interpretations com m ends itself, we should not expect it to be unproblem atic since S ocrates' prefatory rem ark, advising that if Cebes is zealous he m a y hear som ething, suggests th at his statem ent will not be clear and straightforw ard but elusive, for reasons th at remain to be seen.
The m ajor objections to the traditional interpretation appear to have first been raised by Geddes (note D ) :
1. " If the statem ent intended to be conveyed by Plato is one thus entirely paradoxical, it is introduced very abruptly, in a m anner neither natural nor P latonic."
" The succeeding clause, o h b't β ίλ τιο ν τίθνάνα ι [for som e people better to be dead], followed especially by t o v t o i s t o l s άνθρώποις [for these people]
, naturally implies th a t Socrates is predicating the desirableness of death only in the case of a class of men (nam ely, th at of the φιλόσοφοι), not in the case of m ankind as a whole." 3. The zest for life evident in the dialogues shows that P lato did not regard death as universally desirable over life, and, since " P lato believed in a state of punish m ents as well as rew ards, ...w hile Death would bring blessing to the good, it would bring m isery to the w icked." 4. '" It never happens th a t it is better in som e circum stances, and in the case of som e persons, to die than to live' ... is equivalent to saying th at Life is to be chosen rath er than D eath."
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In answer to the first objection Bluck has pointed o u t 5 that there is nothing abrupt here since the desirability of death had already been m entioned at 61C. It has been objected to th is 4 that both there and subsequently (63E-64C ) Socrates speaks only o f the desirability o f death fo r the philosopher, a restriction at variance with the traditional interpretation of this passage as asserting an absolute and universal desirability of death. But to say that Socrates speaks o f the desirability of death only for the philosopher is not quite accurate. He says not that philosophers in particular will benefit from death, but that they in particular will be willing to die, which means only th a t they perceive the desirability of death while non-philosophers may fail to perceive it even if it applies to them as well.
As for the second objection, I agree with Bluck's observation (p. 152) that there is no special problem in taking t o v t o l s rots α ν θ ρ ώ π ο υ to refer to m ankind generally.
T he fourth objection, however, is certainly correct in m aintaining that (out of context) " it never happens that ...som etim es" is m ore naturally taken to mean " never" than " alw ays" , and translators taking the traditional view have tacitly acknowledged this by such devices as inserting " only" before " som etim es" , as did H ein d o rf and Stallbaum in their editions. But in context the traditional reading is both possible and plausible, though m ore aw kw ard than its rival, and, as Bluck notes, " It would be at least redundant on any other interpretation -'it never h a p p e n s... that ... som etim es' " (p. 153).
The third objection I think is the heart o f the m atter. I doubt that the other three objections would have produced serious opposition to the traditional interpretation were it not for the conviction th at P lato simply would not hold death universally superior to life. The textual considerations are only the am m unition, not the cause of the dispute, for on a purely textual level the m ore recent interpretation poses far more problem s than it solves. It involves, for exam ple, the supposition that the first occurrence of " perhaps it will appear surprising to you iP ' (62A2) " introduces a hypothesis which Socrates regards, and expects Cebes to regard, as false," 5 while the second one (62A6, identical except for tense) " introduces what he regards as true, though doubtless p aradoxical." It seems rath er im plausible th at Plato should use the sam e phrase twice in one sentence, expecting us to take it as indicating falsity the first tim e and truth the second. The recent interpretation sim ilarly involves translating ei in the first case as " i f ' and in the second as " th a t" , as H ackforth does, although he acknowledges th at we cannot suppose " th at a Greek w riter would be conscious of two possible m eanings of θαυμαστόν ti." The reason he nevertheless introduces such a distinction into his translation is his feeling that there is a " failure of Socrates to m ake gram m atical structure com pletely conform to logic," but one can put this conversely and suggest th at if the recent interpretation is not logically com patible with the g ram m ar of the sentence perhaps it is the interpretation and not the gram m ar that is at fault. Again, since this interpretation sees only one of the " surprising" facts as true, and the other as false, " w hat Socrates expects Cebes to be surprised at is not two things, but one th in g : nam ely that, despite the extrem e im probability of death never being preferable to life, suicide should always be sinful." Y et the gram m ar indicates th at there are two things to be wondered at, both by the change in tense and by the conjunction " an d " (5e, 62A5). H ack fo rth 's attem pt to account for the shift o f tense is rath er tentative and weak but the traditional interpretation can explain it quite n a tu ra lly : the universal superiority of death to life will surprise Cebes because he had not yet heard of it, while the im propriety of suicide is surprising to him because he has already heard about and been surprised by it (6 IE). A nd to circum vent the implication of two surprising things suggested by the conjunction 8i, H ackforth adm ittedly m istranslates it by " so" (" which it does not m ean" ) instead of " and" .
There have been other attem pts to extract the m eaning of the recent interpreta tion from the text while avoiding the attendant gram m atical problem s, either by construing the g ram m ar differently or altering the text,6 but these readings seem to me less natu ral than the traditional one. We saw earlier th at S ocrates' prefatory rem ark suggests th at this passage requires some attentiveness if one is to hear what it says. Its obscurity seems deliberate since all the interpretations can be stated perfectly c learly ; and if S ocrates' rem ark shows th at P lato was aw are o f the obscurity, presum ably Plato chose not to put it m ore clearly. One reason for this might be a concern that too open an assertion of the superiority of death, w hether for some or all, might be dangerous for those who would not grasp or appreciate the argum ents against suicide. This would be a consideration on either interpretation, though obviously m uch greater on the trad itio n al one. But whatever the motive, a deliberate obscurity could well explain the aw kw ardness o f the one phrase for the traditional view but not, I think, the extent o f the gram m atical contortions necessary for the recent one.
As the above considerations show, the adoption o f the recent interpretation over the traditional cannot have been due prim arily to gram m atical considerations. Let us return to the question raised by the third objection, w hether the superiority of death accords with Platonic philosophy, for the gram m atical argum ents are really in the service o f this question. G eddes' first point, th at the zest for life displayed by Socrates in the dialogues is inconsistent with the desirability o f death, is unconvincing. The belief th at death is preferable to life, but suicide im proper, does not require one to spend one's life gloom ily in the throes of W eltschm erz. One might as well m ake the best of it and cheerfully enjoy it to whatever extent possible, as it would no doubt be S ocrates' nature to do. Even in prison Socrates rem ains cheerful and lighthearted, from which one would scarcely infer th at he preferred prison to freedom. Geddes buttresses his argum ent by rem inding us " that P lato believed in a state o f punishm ents as well as rew ards..., and th at, while D eath would bring blessing to the good, it would bring m isery to the w icked." Socrates does indeed say th at death is better for the good than the evil (63C) and better for the " initiated" than the " u n itiated" (69C), but he 6. Cf. T a r a n ; Hans R e y n e n , " Phaidoninterpretationen" , Herm es 96 (1968) 
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never says th at death is so far inferior for the non-philosopher th at it would be better for him not to die. The punishm ents aw aiting the evil will m ake their state an unpleasant one but pleasure is not the highest value for Plato. U nlike the concept of eternal dam nation, P la to 's concept of posthum ous punishm ent w hether literal or m etaphorical, is one of purification, if not by the m echanism described later in the m yth, at least through the cycles of reincarnation which are purgations as well as punishm ent. An evil person who dies m ay suffer, but the suffering is a purgation and incentive to em end himself, which would be lacking in his continued life. As Bluck observes, " the soul, however much it m ay be tainted, stands a better chance of attaining some knowledge o f tru th , or at any rate of receiving desirable and needful conversion, when separated from the body" (p. 153). I know of nowhere in the dialogues where it is suggested that life is superior to death for the individual, the closest equivalent being the present prohibition against suicide, which, however, is explicitly directed at " those for whom death is b etter" . On the other hand there are suggestions throughout the dialogues o f the superiority of death to life from a personal point of view (a superiority which disappears from an im personal, hence unselfish point of view, resulting in the prohibition of suicide). In the A pology, for exam ple, Socrates argues that it is a m istake to consider death an evil, and we ought rath er consider it a great blessing (40B-C), and in the L aw s, written at the end of P la to 's career as the A p o lo g y was at the beginning, the A thenian denies th at life is superior to death (V III 828D). Sim ilarly, the Phaedo, Phaedrus, and Tim aeus all suggest th at the highest good for man is the ascent to wisdom, the unobstructed beholding of tru th , but that this cannot be accom plished during life due to unavoidable restraints by our soul's corporeal prison ; conversely all evil and misery is ascribed to the baseness of corporeal desires, which we are finally rid of in death.
This point o f view is highlighted by the interlude which follows S ocrates' claim th a t death is not to be feared, and precedes his attem pt to defend th at claim. C rito interrupts to report th at the executioner has asked him to warn Socrates to speak as little as possible, lest his excitem ent interfere with the poison, for when that happens a second or third dose is som etim es necessary. Socrates replies that in that case he should be prepared to adm inister two or three doses if necessary. Paul Friedlander's com m ents are worth re p e a tin g :
The m an who adm inisters the poison appears twice in the dialogue. A t the beginning (63D), he warns Socrates to speak as little as possible lest the poison have to be adm inistered " twice and three tim es." Socrates for once does not obey, since to give up this conversation would be to deny this very being. If necessary, the m an should prepare a cup " even twice and three tim es." In the Gorgias (498E), in the Philebus (60A), and in the Laws (956E), P lato uses the p ro v e rb : " Even twice and three tim es the good (or the rig h t)!" It is hardly im aginable th at he would not have had in mind this " proverb" , as he calls it in the Philebus, since he has Socrates repeat the same words for em phasis. This is connected with the brief scene tow ard the end when Socrates asks the sam e man adm inistering the poison w hether it is permissible to offer a libation to the gods. To offer poison to the gods? T hat would be a sacrilege but for the fact that the poison here is som ething good, a healing pow er.7
It therefore seems to me that, in term s of com patibility with the Phaedo and the Platonic position generally, as well as in term s of gram m atical plausibility, the traditional interpretation has m ore to recom m end it than the others.
R egardless o f how one interprets the passage, Cebes' desire to hear " something clear" is clearly not yet satisfied. S ocrates' initial warning of obscurity, and concession th at w hat he is saying sounds surprising are com plem ented by Cebes' re a c tio n : " laughing quietly he said 'Zeus be w itn ess!', speaking in his own dialect." H e is so taken aback by the paradox th at suicide is wrong even when death is preferable, th a t he drops his A ttic and m om entarily reverts to his m other tongue. That he is not overreacting is clear from S ocrates' re p ly : " Thus stated it would indeed appear unreasonable (& \oyov) ." Since the rem ainder o f the section consists of S ocrates' attem p ts to clarify and justify his paradox, our own attem pt to understand and evaluate it is best tied to the subsequent developm ent o f the discussion.
His first attem p t to replace the unreason (tiXoyov) with an account (Xoyos) is presented equally obscurely, by recourse to certain esoteric m ystery doctrines, evidently of O rphic origin,8 which depict us as in sort o f a p riso n 9 from which it would be im pious to escape since we are possessions of the gods (62B). This is an " im posing saying and not easy to see through" , he says. Together with his description o f it as esoteric ‫׳««(‬ α π ο ρ ρ ή το υ ), this suggests th at it is not to be taken literally but calls for a m etaphorical interpretation, as is true of P la to 's religious passages generally. Since life consists o f the presence of the soul in the body (105C, cf. 64C), the claim th at life is a kind o f prison into which we have been put by the gods suggests the body is a kind of prison in which the soul has been confined by the gods -an interpretation which accords with subsequent passages in the P haedo.'0 The application o f this view of life to m ankind generally (ol άνθρωποι -62B4) provides some confirm ation of the suggestion th a t death is better for all men, for life conceived as an im prisonm ent would certainly be inferior to death conceived as a liberation.
The reason which Socrates proceeds to give for not attem pting escape from this prison (i.e. for not com m itting suicide) seems at first a rather base appeal to f e a r: W ouldn't you, if one of your possessions killed him self w ithout your signifying th a t you wished him to die, be angry with him and, if you had some way of punishing him, w ouldn't you punish him ? (62C 1-4) Cebes, however, sees in this doctrine a better reason for refraining from suicide, a reason so com pelling that the problem ceases to be why we should refrain from suicide but, on the contrary, why we should w ant to die at all. Gods are presum ed to be suprem ely g o o d ,11 which m eans th at we are now being cared for by the best of all m asters, far better cared for than we could for ourselves. A philosopher is most likely to realize this and should therefore be least of all men willing to die, whereas Socrates m aintains the reverse. But -perhaps because he preferred to leave the m atter in popular religious term s -ap art from praising Cebes' tenacity in tracking down argum ents, Socrates appears ready to let the m atter drop, until Sim m ias undertakes to prom pt him : " But indeed, Socrates, this tim e there seems even to me to be som ething in w hat Cebes says" , and he restates C ebes' objection.
S ocrates' reply replaces his previous appeal to the traditional religious motives of rew ard and punishm ent with an argum ent which, though m ore interesting, does not yet resolve the tension between the claim s that death is preferable but suicide wrong. H e says that he expects that after death he will be with other gods no less good and wise than these; which m ay explain why he does not mind dying, but only skirts C ebes' and S im m ias' objection w ithout disposing of the underlying difficulty that gave rise to it. This problem is best stated here in term s of a pair of closely related questions: If in death we exchange our present m asters for other sim ilar ones, why is life any m ore an im prisonm ent than d eath ? If life is the condition of being cared for by good and wise gods, why depict this as an im prisonm ent and thereby as an unpleasant and abnorm al constrain t? -on the contrary, if life is an im prisonm ent executed by good and wise gods, doesn't it follow that it is intrinsically good, and that philosophers, of all people, should be least, not m ost willing to die, even if other gods aw ait them after d eath ? N either of these questions is directly answered by S ocrates' reply, so, following C ebes' exam ple, let us try to track down its position more precisely.
A t the beginning and end of Socrates' reply is a reference to his trial, to which he com pares his present defence of the claim th a t death is a benefit: I think you are saying that it is necessary for me to defend myself (a-iroXoyr^aaadai) on these m atters as if in a court of law... I shall try to defend m yself (onroXoyTiaacrdaL) m ore convincingly before you than before the judges. It is im m ediately after the first of these statem ents that he say s:
If I did not think, Sim m ias and Cebes, first that I would be with other gods both wise and good, and further with departed men better than those here, I would be wrong not to be annoyed by death. But you may be sure that I hope to arrive am ong good men, although I would not com pletely depend upon th is; but that I shall be with divine m asters who are com pletely good, you may be sure that if I would depend upon anything in these m atters I would upon this. (63B5-C4)
In addition to the other questions ju st raised about this passage we may ask as well who are these " other gods" . It is natural to assume they are the traditional gods o f the underw orld,12 H ades and Persephone perhaps, but the abode Socrates refers to seems not to be the traditional place of the dead at all. He says, for exam ple, that he is less certain o f being with good men than with these gods, and since he evidently believed that m any departed men were g o o d ,13 the doubt seems to be w hether he will 12. Who are designated by this term in the Laws (828C). 13. E.g. Meno 93A.
be together with the other departed men at a ll.14 But the traditional picture o f H ades, on the contrary, was much m ore definite about hum an beings associating with one another than with gods. Besides this, the characterization o f death as liberation indicates th a t the traditional H ades is not m eant, for it was never conceived in such term s. The suggestion th at our passing over to the " other gods" constitutes a liberation carries with it the im plication th a t these gods are not of the sam e order as the O lym pians at all, since passing from one such group of " wise and good" gods to another hardly seems liberating. But if the " other gods" were conceived in term s of a higher order to which even our present " m asters" are subject, and to which we are therefore already indirectly subject, our release to them from the present gods would m ean only th a t we were being brought m ore directly under their sway rather than exchanging one set of m asters for another, and would be a significant liberation, even if not total. The possibility th at Socrates is referring to a higher order o f divinity here is one th a t we shall be returning to shortly.
S o crates' circum scription of the present discussion by com parisons o f it with his trial m ay call to mind th at one of the charges against him was the introduction of " other new deities (da'ipoves)". Is there perhaps some connection between the " other deities" he is accused of introducing and the " other gods" (0«ous) m entioned in his present apologia? A lthough in the S ym p o siu m P lato distinguishes between gods (dtoi) and daim ons (b a i^o vts), no such distinction seems intended in the A p o lo g y , where bainoves is used in accordance with its prim ary m eaning of " god" , and where its use was in any case probably dictated by the language of the actual indictm ent (it appears in X enophon's account as well).
To consider identifying the " other gods" of the Phaedo with the " other deities" of the A p o lo g y gives rise however to the question o f the identity o f the deities Socrates was accused o f introducing. T here seems to be no clear evidence about this. A ristophanes shows him introducing new deities that are " clouds" , which suggests th at S ocrates m ay have sought to substitute for traditional theological explanations some other explanatory principles or abstraction that may have been accorded (or thought to be accorded) ontological sta tu s; although in view o f A ristophanes' characterization of Socrates as a sophist, the clouds may be m eant only to represent the beclouding principles o f sophistry. It would be tem pting to take the clouds to be parodies o f the ontological " form s" , were it not that A ristotle's rem arks and X enophon's silence have convinced scholars th at the theory o f form s originated with P lato, not Socrates. However, we can see from his treatm ent of P lato th at A ristotle did not always accord full credit to the subjects o f his historical surveys, and R. E. A lle n 15 has recently shown th at the custom ary dividing line between S ocratic and Platonic philosophy, according to which Socrates is on one side and the theory o f form s on the other, is by no m eans sharp enough to support this exclusion. A nother possibility is th at the dainovts o f the A p o lo g y refer to such beings as S ocrates' famous 14 botLiioviov (" divine sign" ) to which he there m akes reference.16 On either of these interpretations the " other deities" refer not to any denizens of ancient Greek orthodoxy (in fact the sam e accusation specifically charged him with not recognizing the popular gods) but to beings furnishing man with an avenue to truth, whether in the ontological sense of the form s or the m oral sense of the bat^bvtov. S ocrates' " divine sign" suggests th at the sign of the " right w ay" is to be found by seeking within oneself rath er than by following form al precepts of an organized religion, as the forms m ake possible inquiry and thought in opposition to the mere acceptance of dogm a. On either interpretation, or indeed alm ost any understanding o f what the A thenians might have taken to be other new deities introduced by Socrates, the " other deities" of the A p o lo g y would seem to be gods of philosophy rather than of religion, gods representing the source of truth.
In the Phaedo, Socrates subsequently refers to the other gods in the singular (perhaps a m ore philosophical conception):
W hat then of the soul, that invisible thing (aibes) which goes to another such place th at is noble and pure and invisible (atbr,)), to H ades (‫״‬A ibov) m ost true, next to the good and intelligent g o d ...? (80D 5-7)
H ere too the traditional religious conception is supplanted by a philosophical interpretation, with H ades now representing, as the context shows, the invisible intelligible realm of pure thought, not the visible but inaccessible land that H om er w rote of. In the Cratylus as well H ades was connected with the intelligible realm (403A f ) : the etym ology o f " H ad es" (‫״‬At5?;y) is fancifully derived from " knowledge of beautiful things" (ra K a X a eibevat), with the explanation that the disem bodied souls' desire for virtue is fulfilled by the wisdom of Pluto, from which they were previously cut off by the " fluttering and m an ia" of the body. H ades is then the realm to which purified (404A1) souls aspire in their desire for knowledge. These passages tend to bear out Friedlander's claim that for P lato " the invisible, Hades, and the intelligible are interchangeable term s." 17
If we accordingly take the " other gods" o f H ades, that Socrates refers to, as sym bolic of some philosophically conceived source of truth rather than the traditional religious conception of the gods o f the underworld (whether or not we take the opening and closing references to the A p o lo g y as signifying any connection with the " other deities" m entioned there), then the first of the problem s m entioned earlier disappears. W e noted that S ocrates' claim , th at our passing from one set o f divine m asters to another is a release from im prisonm ent, can be justified if the " other gods" represent a higher order than the O lym pians, so th at we are already indirectly subject to them 18 and our passage from life releases us from our present m asters without 18. Perhaps some confirmation of this is Socrates' suggestion (84E f) that when he dies he will come into the presence of that god whose servant he currently is. The fact that he identifies this god as Apollo brings it into conflict with the suggestion that he will be among other gods, however, unless Apollo is meant somehow metaphorically, such as in his characteristic as the god of illumination -which might explain also why he is strangely depicted as dwelling in Hades.
subjugating us to new ones. If the " other gods" of the Phaedo refer to some prim al source on whose basis alone even the O lym pians first becom e possible, then the vision of death as release from prison (rather than transference from one prison to another) becomes intelligible. As life is the im prisonm ent o f the soul within the body and our consequent subjugation to the gods o f the m aterial world, death is the soul's release from its prison to som e realm to which even the present gods are subject, a realm which m ight be described in term s of the forms (as at 80D and context), the good, or other " gods" such as the dem iurge of the Timaeus. Thus in the Phaedrus m yth gods and hum an souls alike pay hom age to the form s by their earnest contem plation of them.
W hat then o f the other question raised -th at our governance by wise and good gods argues the goodness of life, whereas Socrates depicts life as an unpleasant co nstrain t? If this is not to be an outright inconsistency we m ust inquire after some distinction between the way in which life is good and the way it is an unpleasant constraint. In view o f the various reasons we have seen for regarding life as undesirable, in w hat sense can it also be said to be good?
Socrates had w arned Cebes that he would find surprising the claim that death is superior to life, and I have suggested th at the surprising nature of this claim is largely what has prom pted m odern scholars to seek some other m eaning for this passage. W hat then are the attractio n s of life which render so surprising the proposed superiority of d eath ? O ne am ong the several reasons th at people struggle to hold on to life, is fear, fear perhaps of the unknown, of the possible painfulness o f dying, or of possible terro rs after death. A nother is the enjoyment of the pleasures life offers us, which we are reluctant to give up. A third is the sense of accom plishm ent and im portance that life can confer. M any people die lam enting th at " there is so much left to do " , grieved at departing before accom plishing all th at they might. Fourth, some value their lives out of a com m itm ent to helping others, and the belief th at their death will m ake life m ore difficult for others. Leaving aside this last reason for the mom ent, lei us consider w hat S ocrates' response would be to the first three.
In defence of his claim that the philosopher should be willing to die, Socrates argues th at the quest for tru th cannot succeed as long as the soul is conjoined with the body (63E-68B), and concludes:
If you saw a m an com plaining who was about to die, w ouldn't this be a sufficient indication to you th a t he was not, then, a philosopher, but som e lover o f the body (ct>i\oa<j>naTos) ? A nd no doubt he will turn out also to be a lover o f m oney and a lover o f honor, either one or both of these. (68B8-C3)
The first three attachm ents to life th at we noted are thus functions o f a love of the body, which is by no m eans surprising since life is defined in term s of the soul's conjunction with the body. The first two, involving pleasures and pains, correspond specifically to the present category of " lover of m oney" , all of them being applications of w hat, in the Republic, is called the appetitive elem ent. The third, involving am bition, corresponds here to the love of honor, the " spirited" elem ent o f the Republic. To say th a t our attachm ents to life are based on a love of the body will not, however, discredit them unless the body can be shown to be unw orthy of this love.
There are occasional hints in the Phaedo of such unworthiness, such as the claim that love o f the body is the basis of w ar and discord (66C) and, in general, of all the evils we suffer (81 A, 83B-C), and S ocrates' dying rem ark that " we owe a cock to A sclepius" (1 18A7-8), the god o f healing, which m ay suggest th a t life and therefore the body is like a disease of the soul, presum ably because it keeps the soul from its natural goal of the truth, as P la to 's physical illness kept him from the presence of Socrates (59B10). But ap art from these occasional rem arks there is a m ore fundam ental reason for the unw orthiness of corporeal devotion.
It can be seen, for example, in term s of the doctrine of true and false pleasures and pains which Socrates develops in the Republic (583B ff) and Philebus (39A ff, 51A ff) and which is im plicit in the Phaedo as well. At the beginning of the dialogue, introducing his narratio n , Phaedo rem arks that he felt a " strange ( a r o n o v ) m ixture of pleasure and pain" (59A5-6). Exactly how strange this is becomes clear a page later when he relates S ocrates' initial philosophical statem ent, prom pted by the removal of S o crates' leg -iro n s:
W hat a strange ( a r o ir o v ) thing, men, this thing th at people call pleasure seems to be. How w ondrous is the nature of its relation tow ard its apparent opposite, pain, th a t while they do not both w ant to come to people at the sam e tim e,19 yet if som eone pursues one and takes it, he is always kind of forced to take the other also, as though they were joined to one head although they are two. (60B3-C1) How does P haedo's " strange" experience of the m ixture of pleasure and pain fit in with S ocrates' claim th at a " strange" thing about pleasure is th at it will not mix with pain ? If we look at Phaedo's experience we find that his pleasure and pain were m ental -sadness at S ocrates' fate mingled with pleasure at the anticipation of hearing Socrates discourse on philosophy -whereas the context of Socrates' rem ark shows that he is referring to corporeal pleasures and pains. The distinction was left im plicit, perhaps in order to create the apparent contradiction and thus turn our thoughts to the difference between the m ental and corporeal kinds of pleasure and pain, without breaking the continuity of the dialogue with a digression, a kind of indirection which appears regularly in Plato.
S ocrates' expression, " this thing that people call pleasure" , suggests that, unlike Phaedo, he is referring not to true pleasure but to a false " so called" pleasure,20 as does his reference to pain as its " ap p aren t" opposite, and his later rem ark that bodily pleasures " do m ore harm than good" (114E). Their falsity consists precisely in the " strangeness" Socrates points o u t : they are not pleasant or unpleasant in themselves but only in relation to each other, pleasure as a cessation of pain, pain as a cessation o f pleasure. This relativity is the distinguishing m ark o f false pleasure in the R epub lic (583B-584A) and o f the m ost im portant class of false pleasure in the Philebus (42C -44A ). Since the large m ajority of physical pleasures are o f this sort (the R epub lic and Philebus list as exceptions pure sense perceptions) it follows that our devotion to physical pleasure is equally a devotion to physical pain, and so the body's desires com e ultim ately to nought and are not worthy of being indulged. Accordingly, at the end o f the dialogue Socrates speaks of the philosopher as a m an who, in life, has renounced the other pleasures, those o f the body and its ornam ents, as being alien to him and regarding them as doing m ore harm than good, and has pursued the pleasures of learning. (114E1-4) The way in which bodily pleasures turn out to be inseparable from pain and thus unw orthy o f indulgence is further elaborated in the present section. Im m ediately after rem arking th a t only a lover of the body, not a philosopher, would com plain of dying, Socrates suggests th at only a philosopher will be truly courageous and tem perate, while a lover o f the body will brave death only from fear o f som e greater evil and will be tem perate tow ard som e pleasures only as a m eans to obtaining others, so that his courage derives from cowardice and his tem perance from profligacy (68C-69A ). A ttachm ent to the body is thus inherently unw orthy, as the body not only contam inates the true nature o f the soul but involves us in pursuits that are essentially self-negating, and does so m oreover, as Socrates later points out (82E ff), in such a way as to tranquilize us from noticing that this is happening.
From this we can see why death, as release from the body, may be deemed desirable, and why life, even if governed by good and wise gods, m ay be regarded as an undesirable subjugation of the soul. Even if the wicked suffer punishm ents after death, such punishm ent would not be an absolute evil but a means to a greater good, th t ultim ate purification of the soul from corporeal dom ination. But if this serves to show why death is m ore desirable than life, the other h alf of the paradox still rem ain s: how can suicide be im proper -what is the nature of our " service to the gods" which it would be wrong to deprive them of?
In term s o f S ocrates' m etaphor the question is why we do not have the right to escape from our corporeal prison. A gainst the background o f S ocrates' situation in the Phaedo, this m etaphor calls to mind his refusal to escape from his literal prison. The m ajor reason given in the C rito's account of this refusal is th at even if it were personally better for him to escape, it would be a disservice to A thens, whose institutions he had been willing to support and benefit from before they worked to his disadvantage, and which any attem pt of his to escape would tend to underm ine by the implicit rejection o f their legitimacy. In other words, the selfish interests o f the individual m ust be weighed against the individual's responsibility to the whole of which he is a part. Can this principle -which is defended also in the Republic (419A -420D , 519E), for exam ple -explain the im propriety of suicide?
C ertainly it fits in with S ocrates' own m ythological explanation, for to speak of our obligation to the gods, our m asters, is to speak of our obligation to a higher order within which we find our place. But can it be given here a philosophical basis apart from any religious faith? L ater on Socrates expresses his conviction that all things in the cosm os are arranged in accordance with the good, with what is best (97B8 ff), as in the R epublic too all things are said to spring from the good (509B). From this it would follow th a t hum an life is essentially good for the whole, arising as it does from the nature of things, even if it is not personally desirable for the individual. Accordingly in the Timaeus, which is an exposition o f how all things may be seen to follow from the good, it is s a id :
It neither was nor is right for the best one to do anything but what is most beautiful. H e therefore reasoned and discovered, from those things which are by nature visible, that, as a whole, nothing that is mindless will ever be more beautiful than th at which possesses mind, and m oreover th at it is impossible for m ind to be anything ap art from soul. Due to this reasoning, then, when he com posed the whole he placed mind in soul, and soul in body, so that the work he accom plished m ight be m ost beautiful, by nature, and m ost good. (30A6-B7)
We might therefore explain S ocrates' paradox in the following te rm s : although it is uniquely always better for the soul to be uncontam inated by the body, and thus depart from life, we ought nevertheless refrain from suicide, for the attendance o f soul to body is requisite for the good of the universe and we m ust uphold this principle. W hile this m ay clarify the paradox, it does not entirely dissolve it, for a tension yet rem ains between our individual inclination and our duty to the whole. It shows us no unification of the duality but only a rejection of one side in favor of the other. N or does it provide any guidance as to how our life should be liv ed : it does not tell us wherein our service to the gods consists.
Socrates does give a resolution of the tension between the desirability o f death and the duty not to take one's life, but his solution seems at first to be undertaken in bad faith. He says th at the proper way for a philosopher to spend his life is in the " practising {iizir-qbtvovcnv) of dying and being dead" (64A6). W hile this observes the letter of the prohibition against suicide, does it follow the spirit as well, or does it result in a w ithdraw al from life so com plete that, as far as rendering any service to the gods is concerned, we m ight ju st as well be dead? We m ust see exactly what Socrates m eans by it.
In response to S ocrates' claim th a t the m ultitude is oblivious (XtXydevcu) to this goal o f the philosopher, Sim m ias laughingly insists th at the m ultitude would, on the contrary, agree th at philosophers are m oribund, and would deny being oblivious (ov Xe\r!da(t l v ) th at philosophers deserve to die. They would be right, Socrates replies, except about not being oblivious (nr! XtXrjdevai), for they are oblivious {XeX-qdiv)2' to the way that philosophers are m oribund and deserve to die. The paradox of suicide, th at soul ought to m aintain itself in the corporeal realm despite its natural inclination tow ard the incorporeal form s, presupposed a tripartite division o f the world into the realm o f the forms, the corporeal realm , and the interm ediating soul. S ocrates' attem p t now to show how philosophy is the practising of death is carried out in three stages corresponding to these realm s in ascending order, the first being based on a consideration of corporeal pleasure, the second on the soul's pursuit o f intelligence, and the third on the nature of the forms.
" Does it appear to you proper for a philosopher to take seriously such so-called pleasures as those of food and drink ?" (64D 2-4), Socrates begins, and adds as further exam ples sex (D6) and bodily adornm ents (D9-10). O lym piodorus has pointed o u t22 th a t these three m entions of exam ples illustrate three types of p le a su re : both natural and necessary, natural but not necessary, and neither natural nor necessary (presum ably nothing unnatural would be necessary). The usual view of this passage as an advocation o f asceticism has been a source o f perplexity because of the non-ascetic behavior attrib u ted to Socrates in other dialogues, but in fact there is nothing here th at goes against S ocrates' usual views. First of all he is not arguing against pleasure in general here, but only the false or " so-called" pleasures (ra s r!5ovas K a X o v n h a s) we discussed earlier, and which he shows disdain for in the Republic and Philebus as well. In the case of the so-called pleasures th at are neither natural nor necessary, such as bodily adornm ent, he advocates only clothing w ithout elegance, since elegance is unnecessary. In the case of food, drink, and sex, however, he urges not abstinence but only th at we refrain from taking them seriously (eairovdotKevotL) ; P la to 's earlier m ention th a t X antippe was holding S ocrates' baby son (60A) indicates that Socrates was not celibate even though he is about seventy. The pleasures of food, drink, and sex may be enjoyed as long as no im portance is attached to them, which entails m oderation. W hile the com bination o f enjoym ent, on the one hand, and indifference (not taking seriously), on the other, may seem incom patible, it is no m ore problem atic than the observation in the S ym p o siu m (176C) that Socrates will be equally happy either drinking or not. O ne allows oneself to appreciate the charm s a certain experience has to offer, w ithout forgetting their triviality in com parison to im portant m atters. This attitude is prevalent also in m any oriental traditions, especially those stem m ing from bhakti yoga and m ahayana buddhism , where one moves within the com m on am bit not because of infatuation with it but out of a sence of duty to the world at large, ju st as the philosopher o f the Republic returns to the cave, and the philosopher of the Phaedo rem ains within the prison of life.
The unw orthiness o f bodily pleasures was accepted without argum ent by Sim m ias as being self-evident, but som eone other than he, with his Pythagorean background, might be less easily persuaded. As we have already seen, however, the whole dialogue is to some extent a defence of the claim o f the body's unworthiness. The next stage of the argum ent, the consideration of the soul's quest for intelligence {(¡)pov7]<jt<j>s), presents argum ents o f its own. H ere it is argued th at the body is a hindrance because truth cannot be conveyed by the inaccurate and unclear bodily senses, and can only be attained, if at all, when the soul detaches itself from the body and from bodily sounds and sights, and pleasures and pains, and devotes itself entirely to reasoning (65B-C).
The third stage of the argum ent is devoted to a consideration of the fo rm s:
Do we say th at justice itself is som ething rather than nothing? W e say so indeed, by Zeus ! And again, no doubt, that beauty and goodness are something ? (65D 4-7)
He shortly generalizes from these e x am p les: " I am speaking about everything, such as about largeness, health, strength, and, in a word, of the being o f everything else, what each one happens to be" (D12-E1). It is significant that each exam ple of this new group refers to the corporeal realm , further m itigating in certain ways the ascetic tone o f this passage. For one thing, the rem inder o f the im portance of health and strength reaffirm s the im portance of ¡noderate attention to the body's requirem ents, for it is clear from the Phaedo (cf. 6 6 C 1-2) and other dialogues that an unhealthy body is an im pedim ent to thought. M ore im portant, it calls to mind th at the form s are not a separate world but the truth of this world, so th at we transcend the m aterial realm not by ignoring it but by com prehending it, by observing and grasping the universal and perm anent within particularity and transience.23 A lthough the senses present no truth, they present the necessary basis for the m ind's ascent to truth, and although we should not tak e seriously corporeal pleasures, we must pay attention to the corporeal realm as the place where reality is proxim ally m anifest. Because detachm ent from the body is by m eans o f perceiving the perm anent within the transitory, it is a process arising out o f sensory experience, not out of an im m ediate abrupt and total withdraw al from the world. This is not to deny the obvious asceticism of the passage but only to determ ine its limits and show that the views presented here are perfectly com patible with his position in other dialogues. T he main purpose of his rem arks, however, is to show the soul's need to detach itself as far as possible from the body, when engaged in the quest for truth. Thus with regard to the form s Socrates asks:
Is the highest truth of them contem plated through our bodies, or is this how it stands: whoever of us has trained him self to think m ost fully and precisely each individual selfhood (avro tKaarov) o f the object o f his investigation, will come closest to knowing each thing?
Absolutely.
Then he would do this m ost purely, who, as much as possible, would approach each thing with thought itself, neither bringing along any sight into his thinking nor dragging up any other sensation with his reasoning; but using uncon tam inated thought in itself, he would attem pt to track down each thing, uncontam inated, in itself. (65E1-66A 3) Thus, from a consideration o f the body's pleasures, the soul's learning, and the form s themselves, detachm ent from the body is indicated for the philosopher. N ot only is the body thus irrelevant to the philosophical pursuit, it is actively inim ical: partly because it stirs us up with em otions distracting to the philosophical pursuit, conducive instead to conflict and w ar (66C-D), and partly because, " even if some respite from it should come to us and we turn to some investigation, it falls into our inquiries again at every point, bringing uproar, disturbance, and alarm , so that we are unable, because of it, to behold the tru th " (66D 3-7). Therefore wisdom will be possible, if at all, only after death, and in the m eantim e we can only free ourselves as far as possible from bodily influence. This is why no true philosopher will com plain of dying and will welcome it instead (66E-68B ).
It follows th at the philosopher, unafraid of death, will be m ost truly courageous. O th er people, it has already been noted, brave death out of som e greater fear and resist one pleasure only in order to indulge another (68C-69A ).
Blessed Sim m ias, this would not likely be the right exchange for virtue, exchanging pleasures for pleasures and pains for pains and fears for fears, greater for less, like coins. But that alone is likely the right coin against which all these 23. Cf. Sym posium , 209E f.
(π ά ν τα τ α ύ τ α ) m ust be exchanged, nam ely intelligence (φρόνησιs),24 and for this and with this are all bought and s o ld : real courage and tem perance and justice and, in short, true virtue -with intelligence -both when pleasures and pains and all other such things are added and when they are subtracted. (69A 6-B5) It is in this conception of virtue th at the resolution o f the original tension first becomes apparent, as we shall see. But there is controversy as to w hether the depiction o f virtue in this passage is itself consistent and whether the m etaphor is tenable.25 Geddes and A rcher-H ind both argued th a t the simile between intelligence and money breaks down, but on different g ro u n d s: Geddes because intelligence is not lost in the exchange as is spent m oney, an objection which Bluck too considers unanswerable, though unim portant (p. 155), and which is largely the sam e as H ackforth's grounds for suspecting inconsistency (p. 193); A rcher-H ind because money is valuable only for what it can buy, not intrinsically like intelligence. Burnet tried to remedy the problem by rejecting the passage as an interpolation but his reasons have been largely rejected on the basis of Luce's argum ents.26 Let us proceed by exam ining the passage as a whole, considering G eddes' objection first.
Socrates begins by asserting th at when we resist some pleasure to indulge another, or w ithstand some pain or fear to avoid another, we are not thereby v irtu o u s: such acts do not am ount to virtue (such as tem perance and courage), are not " the right exchange for virtue" . The right coin against which virtues m ust be exchanged,27 the m eans by which we are virtuous, is not hedonistic utilitarianism (" exchanging m ore for less, like coins" ) but intelligence. W hat is the m eaning of this exchange of intelligence for virtue? In the preceding conversation with Sim m ias it was clear that the philosopher who had attained intelligence, and only he, was truly brave and tem perate, thus implying th at intelligence is equivalent to virtue. So we find here the fam iliar Socratic equation of virtue with knowledge and the suggestion th at the various virtues, m utually implying one another, are transform ations o f one another. In th a t case the exchange of intelligence for virtues m ust resemble the exchange of coins in the sense of exchanging one denom ination for another, the total value rem aining the same, as in the M eno (79A 3-10) virtue is " changed into small coin" (κ ιρ μ α τίξ ΐίν ) as justice and tem perance. Exchange in this sense of changing denom inations within the sam e to tal value seems the one required by the second sentence. The m an who has attained intelligence will, in times o f danger, " cash in" his intelligence as courage, and in tim es of tem ptation as tem perance. He remains throughout a m an of intelligence, however, but his intelligence is then m anifest not in itself (in term s of abstract thinking or a certain capacity) but in the particular form or application of courage or tem perance. The other virtues may thus be regarded as practical applications of intelligence, and the m an of intelligence, by thus " cashing in" his intelligence for other fo r m s o f virtue as needed, and afterw ard returning to the general form of intelligence, m ay easily be com pared to one who buys and sells one denom ination for another (with the difference that m onetary denom inations are quantitative and thus larger or sm aller than one another, whereas this would not hold true o f the qualitative differences of virtues). The buying and selling m etaphor is applied to the behavior o f the intelligent m an, which changes (e.g. from tem perate to courageous) to m eet the circum stances, but has its basis in the underlying unchanging identity of intelligence and virtue. This double aspect, whereby the things " bought and sold" for intelligence are in principle equivalent to it, so that none of them are ever really dim inished by the transactions, is m irrored in the double phrase " for this and with this (τούτου... και μ ( τ ά τούτου) are all bought and sold" . The force o f μ (τ ά τούτου is "together with this" ,28 so that virtues are bought and sold not only (in exchange) f o r intelligence but also (together) with i t : since they are at bottom equivalent, intelligence and the virtues are acquired and lost together, as well as being interchangeable. Looked at in this way the m etaphor, though doing double duty, is quite sound. A rcher-H ind's objection too is circum vented since, if the transactions are for other denom inations rather than m erchandise, the value of the m oney (like that of intelligence) is independent of these transactions.
It seems then th at devoting one's life to the " practising of d eath" is not merely an attem pt to approxim ate suicide w ithout technically com m itting this offence. It is in fact a resolution o f the tension between our selfish fulfillment in death and our duty to life, for it not only accords with th at fulfillment but is also equivalent to virtue or excellence, i.e. to the highest m anifestation of life. The detachm ent of soul from body in the practising o f death, being not a physical separation but a detachm ent from undue bodily influence, can be achieved only by self control, that is, by bringing the body under the governance of soul rath er than allowing it to enslave the soul (cf. 69B7, 82E). This bringing of the body under the governance of reason is the meaning of intelligence and thus o f virtue, and also turns out to be m eaning we gave earlier to S ocrates' assertion of our " service to the gods" .
If our service to the gods -or the cosm os, in accordance with whose teleological nature we hum ans have come into existence -m eans bringing m atter under the governance of reason, this will be accom plished not merely by refraining from suicide but only by living a virtuous life, a life devoted to " purification" (69B8-C3) and thereby to bringing corporeity into the service o f reason rather than the reverse. It would be a m istake to conceive this governance o f m atter by reason in term s o f some specific goal or project which man is destined to undertake, such as the control of nature by technology or the rational governm ent o f life and resources by a world-wide bureaucracy. It should rather be said that an apprehension of the good would show us th at the universe would be less perfect w ithout such beings as ourselves. The role required of us to justify our place in the scheme of things is to be what we most distinctively are as hum an b ein g s: not dom inion over nature, which would presuppose th a t reason was not already inherent in nature, and would entail our taking corporeal m atters too seriously, but on the contrary a conversion of our concern from the corporeal to the intelligible.29 It is, as the N eoplatonists elaborated, the reflection of the intelligible back into itself through n a tu re : the natural world arises out of the efficacy of the intelligible and, in its highest nature, m an, beholds its own origin. We m ust therefore m aintain a balance, between the tem ptation of anim al-like devotion to the corporeal and the consum m ation (suicide) of our aspiration to the intelligible, so aS to fill our distinctively hum an role. T ogether with the im propriety of suicide we m ust rem em ber the worthlessness of living the unexam ined life. Only a life devoted to intelligence and excellence (virtue) realizes the distinctively hum an possibilities for being, and while thus our m ost distinctive possibility for life, it also brings us closest to the liberation desired in death. It resolves the antagonism between form and corporeity by placing them in an ordered relatio n sh ip : form is the essential truth of corporeity.
29. While this is naturally somewhat qualified in the context of politics, where the necessity of governing arises, even here (e.g. the Republic) governing is seen not as a prim ary goal of self fulfillment but as a necessary means to secure a society with the maximum opportunity for personal self fulfillment.
